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Boeing and Airbus: Duopoly in Jeopardy?
John Olienyk and Robert J. Carbaugh

Abstract
For decades, Boeing and Airbus have struggled for dominance in the large commercial aircraft market. In 2010 and 2011, the World Trade Organization ruled that each firm has received
illegal subsidies from the governments of the United States and the European Union, which have
enhanced their competitive positions. This paper considers the nature of these rulings and the
future competitive environment in the global jetliner industry.
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Recent rulings by the World Trade Organization (WTO) have focused
attention once again on the battle between Boeing and Airbus for dominance in the
market for large commercial jetliners. The latest findings by the WTO are that
both Airbus and Boeing have been recipients of illegal subsidies from their
respective governments, and that these subsidies have given each firm unfair
advantages in the marketplace. These rulings come as no surprise to most
observers. Both the European Union and the United States have a long history of
subsidizing the manufacturing of civilian jetliners. In this paper, as a follow-up to
two papers that we have written for this journal (Carbaugh and Olienyk, 2002 and
2004) on competition between Boeing and Airbus, we briefly review the history of
subsidies in the commercial jetliner market and analyze the implications of the
recent WTO rulings for the nature and composition of the market going forward.
The Birth of Airbus
Airbus was founded in the late 1960s in the hope of preserving the remnants of
Europe’s fragmented commercial jetliner manufacturing base, consolidating it, and
growing it into an international competitor. At that time, the global market for
large commercial jetliners was overwhelmingly dominated by American firms.
Boeing, Lockheed and Douglas Aircraft controlled about 90% of the market. The
governments of France, Germany, Britain and Spain recognized that in order to
meet the challenge from the Americans and overcome the huge barriers to entry in
the industry, they needed to combine their resources. In 1970 the Airbus
consortium was officially established, and the governments of the four countries
made major commitments for financial support of this enterprise. This support
came largely in the form of loans at below-market rates to fund the bulk of the
development costs for the A300, the first airliner produced by this consortium.
Government loans were also provided to European suppliers of Airbus, particularly
Rolls-Royce, which produced the engines that were used to power the Airbus
aircraft.
This method of financing, called launch aid, has been utilized to support the
development of the entire family of jetliners now produced by Airbus, and has
contributed significantly to the growth of Airbus. As time passed, this funding
evolved from direct grants to reimbursable advances that were linked to sales.
Under this system, loans from Europe’s governments are repaid gradually with
each aircraft or engine that is sold. However, if sales fail to reach specified goals,
the loan is not fully repaid. Thus, the governments assume a portion of the market
risk of developing new aircraft or engines. This arrangement reduces market risk
for Airbus and its suppliers, and gives them the ability to borrow in the open market
at lower rates than they would otherwise have to pay for additional financing that
they might require.
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Consolidation in the United States
As the Airbus experiment unfolded, changes in the marketplace occurred on the
other side of the Atlantic as well. Lockheed lost a huge gamble when its L-1011
wide-body jet failed to attain profitability, and the firm withdrew from commercial
aircraft production in the early 1980s. Production problems with its DC-8 and
DC-9 jetliners, along with the cost of development of the DC-10, forced Douglas to
merge with McDonnell Aircraft, a major producer of military aircraft, in 1967.
Douglas Aircraft operated as a separate unit within McDonnell Douglas, but
continued to be plagued by production problems and tepid sales. Weakness in its
commercial aircraft division ultimately caused McDonnell Douglas to seek a
merger with Boeing, and the two firms merged in 1997. This merger left Boeing
as the sole producer of large commercial jetliners in the United States and resulted
in an effective duopoly in the global market, with Airbus as the only other major
competitor.
Although the U.S. government does not provide launch aid or loans to
Boeing (nor to engine manufacturers such as General Electric or other Boeing
suppliers) for new development programs, it has received “indirect” subsidies.
For example, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) supports
aeronautics and propulsion research that is shared with Boeing. Research
sponsored by the Department of Defense creates technological spin-offs that are
reflected in commercial jetliner innovation, most notably in aircraft engines and
aircraft design. Furthermore, several state and local governments, particularly the
states of Washington, Illinois and Kansas, provide tax breaks to Boeing, which has
production facilities in those states.
The 1992 Accord
As Airbus began to increase its market share and establish itself as a viable
competitor, Boeing became increasingly vocal about the unfairness of the launch
aid that Airbus received. Airbus responded by drawing attention to the indirect
subsidies received by Boeing. As sales of the Airbus A-320 began to chip away at
sales of the popular Boeing 737 in the latter part of the 1980s, the debate became
much more heated. This resulted in both sides coming to the bargaining table, and
in 1992 they agreed on limitations on the level of subsidies. Launch aid for Airbus
was limited to 33 percent of development costs and indirect subsidies to Boeing
were limited to 3 percent of revenue.
However, as Boeing continued to lose market share to Airbus in the ensuing
years, trade frictions intensified once again. In 2004, Boeing accused Airbus of
violating the provisions of the 1992 pact and renounced the agreement. Trade
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representatives from the United States and the European Union attempted to
negotiate a settlement to the dispute in 2005, but their efforts were unsuccessful.
Boeing filed a suit at the WTO, claiming that Airbus received illegal subsidies from
European governments. Airbus immediately retaliated by filing a suit against
Boeing, claiming that the federal and state subsidies received by Boeing were
illegal. (Platzer, 2009).
The 2010 and 2011 Rulings
The first of the WTO’s rulings in the case was announced in June, 2010. The
WTO found that the government loans to Airbus, particularly those made to
support development of the huge Airbus A380, contained elements of illegal
subsidy and that these subsidies should be halted immediately. The launch aid
was found to violate international trade regulations, resulting in a competitive
disadvantage for Boeing. The government loans in question were priced at below
market rates and had overly generous repayment terms. This decision could
potentially result in Airbus having to repay or restructure billions of dollars in past
aid or risk allowing the United States to retaliate by increasing tariffs on products
imported from Europe. Airbus has filed an appeal, claiming that the ruling is
incorrect. The WTO ruling on the Airbus appeal is expected later in 2011.
Although the WTO cannot force countries to eliminate subsidies, it can authorize
the country where the harmed company resides to retaliate with trade sanctions of
an equal amount, giving each side an incentive to claim maximum harm. It is up to
the losing government to define its compliance in a proposal agreed to by the
winner.
Airbus officials emphasize that the WTO’s decision does not rule out
launch aid in principle, indicating that Airbus fosters competition that facilitates
healthy choice for its customer airlines. They also claim that the WTO’s decision
does not imply that the subsidies have caused material injury to Boeing in the form
of lost sales and profits. However, Boeing officials have declared that the
landmark decision is good news for aerospace workers in America who for decades
have competed against a heavily subsidized Airbus. The decision should “level
the playing field” and provide a vital precedent for other Airbus products or other
nations with intentions to enter the commercial jetliner business, according to
Boeing.
In February, 2011, the WTO issued a separate report declaring that Boeing
received illegal subsidies from the U.S. government, to the detriment of Airbus.
The WTO found that some funding provided by the U.S. Department of Defense
and NASA resulted in illegal subsidies. Support for Boeing from the states of
Washington, Illinois, and Kansas was also deemed an illegal subsidy. Although
Airbus claimed in its filing that Boeing received about $24 billion in illegal
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subsidies from state and federal governments in the United States, the initial report
of the WTO did not reveal how much of the aid received by Boeing was illegal.
This data will be forthcoming later in 2011 when the WTO makes its report
available to the public.
Thus far, Boeing has acknowledged the receipt of $2.6 billion in improper
subsidies. As for Airbus, it claims that the WTO ruling, when made public, will
show that without those illegal subsidies Boeing would not have been able to
launch the 787. All in all, Airbus estimates that it has lost at least $45 billion
through lost sales and lower prices as a result of Boeing subsidies.
Boeing and Airbus have each claimed victory in the subsidy dispute.
Boeing contends that the rulings are completely separate and deal with very
specific issues. According to Boeing, the WTO ruled clearly in 2010 that all
government money provided to Airbus for development of new aircraft is an illegal
subsidy and must cease. That debate is over and it is now time for compliance,
according to Boeing. Boeing has also stated that it is prepared to accept
compliance with a WTO ruling regarding its illegal subsidies. However, Airbus
has emphatically resisted abandoning launch aid. It views the two rulings as a key
to a future negotiated settlement by Europe and the United States under which
launch aid and indirect subsidies will continue but they will be subject to specified
limits, similar to the 1992 agreement.
According to Airbus, only when the two companies terminate litigation and
begin negotiating will a basis be created for a level playing field in global aircraft
manufacturing. Most industry experts agree that negotiation between the United
States and the European Union remains the only reasonable way out.
Unfortunately, such negotiations in the past have dragged on for years, and while
Boeing and Airbus dither, the market environment is changing.
The Evolving Competitive Environment
Manufacturers of civilian commercial aircraft are normally divided broadly into
two classes. In one class are the producers of large civilian aircraft, those with 100
or more seats. This market segment is a duopoly shared by Boeing and Airbus as
producers of commercial jetliners and General Electric, Pratt and Whitney, and
Rolls Royce as producers of jet engines. To spread their risk and decrease the cost
of capital investment in new products, these firms are increasingly engaging in
multinational joint ventures and creating partnerships with firms in countries such
as China and Japan. The other class of producers is comprised of firms that
manufacture smaller jetliners, those with fewer than 100 seats. This market for
regional jets is dominated by Canada-based Bombardier and Brazil-based Embraer.
These firms have displaced European manufacturers of regional jets in the global
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market and are beginning to compete against Boeing and Airbus in the lower end of
the 100-plus seat jetliner category. (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2005).
Bombardier is developing two new aircraft to compete in this market. The
CS100 and the CS300 will have seating capacity in the 110 to 130 range. These
planes will be built partly of composite materials and will burn 20 percent less fuel
per passenger mile than models currently on the market. The maiden flight of the
first CSeries prototype is scheduled for 2012, with first deliveries in 2013.
Bombardier has 90 firm orders for these aircraft. Embraer has had aircraft of
similar size in service for several years. The two largest members of Embraer’s
E-Jet family of aircraft, the E190 and E195, have seating capacity in the 98 to 122
range. Airlines from around the world are currently flying a combined total of
more than 360 of these aircraft. These CSeries and E-Jet aircraft are in direct
competition with the smaller versions of the Boeing 737 and the Airbus A320
family of aircraft.
Additional competition is springing up in other parts of the globe. Russian
manufacturers have recently produced the first new civilian airliner since the
collapse of the Soviet Union. The Sukhoi Superjet 100 is a 75 to 95 seat aircraft
that its manufacturers claim is more efficient and less expensive to operate than
Bombardier and Embraer aircraft of similar size. Sukhoi has more than 200 orders
for the plane so far, from buyers in Thailand, Indonesia, Hungary and Mexico as
well as Russia. The first deliveries are scheduled for the first quarter of 2011, and
there are plans to build stretched versions of this aircraft that would have greater
seating capacity. Sukhoi’s civilian aircraft division is 25 percent owned by the
Italian conglomerate Finmeccanica, which will make it easier for Sukhoi to
penetrate western markets. Another Russian aircraft manufacturer, Irkut, has
recently signed a contract with the Russian government to continue research and
design work on a large commercial aircraft. The Irkut MS-21 will come in three
variants, with seating capacity ranging from 150 to 212. Projected completion of
the first prototype is scheduled for 2013, with first deliveries scheduled for 2016.
It is important to remember that while large commercial aircraft are not currently
being built in Russia, the Russians have shown in the past that they have the
capability to produce significant numbers of such aircraft.
Historically, the Asian aerospace industries have produced a steady stream
of failed commercial aircraft endeavors. Most ventures, such as South Korea’s
plans in the 1990s to manufacture a 50-seat regional jet, and several attempts by
Japanese firms during the 1960s to 1990s to produce a commercial aircraft, never
got beyond the drawing board. The Indonesian government pumped billions of
dollars into the development of a regional jet in the 1990s. Two prototypes were
built, but the project was ultimately abandoned. The Chinese attempted to
produce what was essentially a copy of the Boeing 707 in the 1960s, but that project
did not go beyond the prototype stage.
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However, Japan’s Mitsubishi has recently re-entered the regional jet
market. The inaugural flight of the 88-seat MRJ90 is scheduled for 2012, with the
first deliveries scheduled in early 2014. Mitsubishi already has 65 firm orders for
the MRJ90, and it is preparing to launch a larger, 100-seat model as well. In
addition, Japanese firms in total are responsible for building about 20 percent of
Boeing’s 777 and about 35 percent of the new Boeing 787. The technology
transfer implied in this type of arrangement increases the possibility that Japanese
manufacturers can support the development of larger aircraft in Japan in the future.
The China Factor
In the near future, the greatest threat to the Boeing-Airbus duopoly in large aircraft,
and the dominance of Bombardier and Embraer in the regional jet market, will
likely come from China. Like its Asian neighbors, China has had some false starts
in its attempts to produce indigenous civilian jetliners over the past forty years.
But all of that is in the past. The large increases in per capita income resulting
from the rapid economic growth in China are creating significant increases in
demand for air travel within the country, and the Chinese government intends to
ensure that much of that demand is met with new regional jets and large
commercial aircraft developed and manufactured in China.
In 2008 the Chinese government launched the Commercial Aircraft
Corporation (COMAC). COMAC is a consortium of Chinese aerospace firms
brought together to pursue a single goal – to develop and produce of commercial
jetliners in China. COMAC immediately took control of a regional jet project in
China that was already under development. Development of the ARJ-21 began in
2002, and its maiden flight was in late 2008. This aircraft has seating capacity of 70
to 95 passengers, and by late 2010 it boasted 240 firm orders, mostly from Chinese
airlines. The first deliveries are scheduled for late 2011.
A greater potential threat to Boeing and Airbus will come in the form of
COMAC’s C919. The C919 will be a new entrant in the large commercial aircraft
market, with passenger capacity of 168 to 190. Its maiden flight is scheduled for
2014, with first deliveries slated for 2016. The C919 will be constructed using
lightweight carbon composites and will be powered by new fuel-efficient engines.
Its designers anticipate that it will be 12 to 15 percent more fuel efficient than
comparable Boeing and Airbus aircraft. While this aircraft has been developed by
Chinese engineers and will be produced in China, its engines and internal systems
will come largely from western aviation technology firms, including GE Aviation,
Honeywell, and Eaton Corp. These foreign suppliers will work with Chinese
firms in joint ventures to produce the components. This structure will, of course,
involve substantial technology transfer as the Chinese partners in these ventures
gain knowledge and experience from working with foreign suppliers on each
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component part of the aircraft. Moreover, additional technology transfer is taking
place in Tianjin, where Airbus has built a complete production line for the Airbus
A320, and aircraft are being delivered from that facility to fill current orders from
Chinese airlines. Several Chinese firms also serve as subcontractors to Boeing.
The C919 project is indicative of China’s resolve to become a global power
in the aviation industry. The original plan had been for the first delivery of the
C919 to occur in 2020, but with the creation of COMAC and by putting the C919
on a fast track, China has sent a strong message to the rest of the industry that it
intends to become a major player not only in China, but in the global market as
well. By pushing this initiative, the Chinese government is showing its
determination to accelerate the evolution of its industrial base from that of a
low-cost producer of cheap labor-intensive products to one characterized by
technologically advanced, locally designed and engineered, high value-added
production.
Success in the aircraft industry is an important component of this vision of
the Chinese government. Such success would have a positive impact on a host of
other industries related to the aviation industry, such as electronics and material
sciences. But success is not assured. Despite recent progress, the Chinese
aircraft industry still faces major challenges. The commercial aviation business
has very high entry costs and the established firms -- Boeing, Airbus, Bombardier,
and Embraer -- will not sacrifice market share quietly. Also, airlines insist on
quality, reliability, safety and support as much as they do a competitive price.
Given China’s substandard reputation in product quality, airline executives might
well be skeptical about making major commitments to Chinese aircraft. (Blitzinger,
2010) That said, if the same resolve and ability to marshal vast amounts of
resources that went into the construction of the Three Gorges Dam and the
development of the Chinese space program and other megaprojects are directed
toward the commercial airline industry, the odds of a positive outcome may be
quite good.
Conclusions
Boeing and Airbus have dominated the market for large commercial aircraft for the
past three decades. In recent years they have split the market almost equally, with
a slight edge to Airbus. In 2010, Boeing delivered 462 jetliners while Airbus
delivered 510. Up to now, the two firms have been protected by very large
barriers to entry. That protection, however, is weakening as other firms are
beginning to enter the lower end of this market. This is an important issue for
Boeing and Airbus, since the 737 and A320 families of aircraft accounted for about
80 percent of deliveries and a little more than half the dollar value of sales for each
of these firms in 2010.
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To meet the challenge from these new competitors, Boeing and Airbus have
several options. One option is to make small design changes and install more
efficient engines to reduce operating costs for their smaller aircraft. Another is to
completely re-engineer these planes and essentially produce new models in this
market class. A third is to maintain the status quo and depend on their reputation
for quality and service to fend off these competitors.
Whatever course of action Boeing and Airbus take, what might be most
troublesome for them is the path that these new competitors are taking to compete
for market share. While both Boeing and Airbus have been found guilty by the
WTO of benefitting from illegal government subsidies, their new competitors have
been receiving substantial government support as well. This can be seen most
directly in the fact that the central government of China and the regional
government of Shanghai own a substantial stake in the Chinese consortium
COMAC. As another example, Bombardier is using about $1 billion in launch aid
from the governments of Canada and Britain for development of its CSeries
aircraft. The British government has also provided subsidies to Bombardier as a
way of keeping some its production in Northern Ireland, which is an economically
depressed area. Ironically, Bombardier has charged that the rapid growth that
Embraer has recently been experiencing has been supported by large subsidies
from the Brazilian government. This is after the WTO found that both
Bombardier and Embraer were guilty of taking advantage of illegal subsidies in the
late 1990s and early 2000s. Embraer has denied the most recent charges and has
pointed to the direct government support that Bombardier is receiving.
The Boeing-Airbus subsidy dispute is thus only part of a much larger issue.
Resolution of this conflict has implications not only for how Boeing and Airbus
will compete with each other in the future, but also how successful the new rivals
will be. If Boeing and Airbus continue to ignore the trade regulations set by the
WTO, they create a precedent for other competitors to follow. The result could be
that governments will feel that they have carte blanche to support their domestic
aircraft manufacturers at will, thus bringing the entire notion of free trade into
doubt. For this reason, we feel that it is vitally important for trade representatives
from the United States and the European Union, in concert with Boeing and Airbus,
to expedite negotiations and agree to a comprehensive set of rules regarding
government subsidies that would be binding for all members of the WTO.
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